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Information technology (IT) offers inestimable capability and has been leveraged extensively by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) to build national security systems, business systems, and 
virtually all of today’s weapon systems.  As the DoD continues to transform its forces and 
business systems to meet the challenges of the 21st century, it will continue to rely on the 
increased functionality that IT delivers, even as its cost decreases.   
The DoD’s goal is to acquire IT systems quickly and cost effectively. However, this goal is 
rarely achieved because the deliberate process through which the DoD acquires IT systems does 
not—and cannot—keep pace with the rapid development that is occurring in today’s information 
age. The DoD relies upon a singular, one-size-fits-all process to acquire its systems and services. 
As a result, IT systems are subject to excessive risk-reduction strategies, suboptimal test and 
evaluation (T&E) protocols, and inflexible requirements. Improving the acquisition process for 
IT is critical if the DoD is to reduce costs and improve the effectiveness of its systems.  
The DoD has made several revisions to its acquisition policies in an attempt to shorten the 
acquisition cycle-time. These revisions, however, consist of little more than changes to the 
traditional acquisition model. Unsurprisingly, these reform initiatives have generally not had 
much impact—the time line for IT acquisitions remains incredibly long. A 2010 House Armed 
Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform found that the delivery of 
defense IT systems requires between 48 and 60 months. Considering that commercial IT is on a 
12- to 18-month upgrade cycle, it is often the case that the DoD’s new IT systems are outdated—
often by several generations—by the time they are implemented.   
A successful IT project is often defined as one that is delivered on time and on budget, with the 
required features and functions (The Standish Group, 1995). ). The project should also be of the 
current IT product generation (i.e., the product in question should be contemporaneous with 
commercially available systems, or in the case of highly-specific DoD systems, the relevant 
technical elements of commercial systems). Studies of both commercial and government IT 
projects indicate that success is rarely achieved. For example, a 2008 Government 
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Accountability Office (GAO) report found that nearly half of all major federal government IT 
projects were re-baselined, with half of those being re-baselined more than once. Ideally, IT 
development would make use of a shorter time line, using an iterative process that regularly 
delivers updated products.  
Multiple independent studies of the government’s IT acquisition process have been undertaken in 
the last few years in an effort to identify ways to improve its overall effectiveness, and although 
some have focused directly on the DoD’s IT acquisition, others have sought to address the more 
general, government-wide challenges. We conducted a meta-analysis of these and identified 
common threads with regard to process deficiencies and recommendations.  Our proposed new 
acquisition process recognizes and adapts these commonly identified elements, attempting to 
correct the acknowledged deficiencies. 
In 2010 Congress mandated that the Secretary of Defense implement a new IT acquisition 
process based on a 2009 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force report.  Congress further 
stipulated that the system “be designed to include (1) early and continual involvement of the 
user; (2) multiple, rapidly executed increments or releases of capability; (3) early, successive 
prototyping to support an evolutionary approach; and (4) a modular, open-systems approach” 
(National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2010, § 804). Our proposed acquisition process 
meets this mandate.  
Our proposed process is specifically tailored to the unique, desired attributes of modern defense 
business systems. The process incentivizes the use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, 
encourages the development of enterprise solutions, and emphasizes technology-neutral 
approaches. Its conceptual goal is to complete one development cycle (360 degrees) in one year 
(approximately 360 days). Hence, it was named  IT 360.1 Embedded within IT360 are a series of 
initiatives that, we believe, will allow the DoD to enhance the speed and efficiency with which it 
acquires its defense business systems. These initiatives include spiral development; smaller, 
                                                 




quicker to deliver, useful sets of capabilities; rapid delivery; the greater use of COTS products; 
the aggressive use of prototypes and demonstrations; continuous and integrated testing; 
decentralized execution; the inclusion of end users; and enhanced competition.  
IT 360 is both an evolutionary and an incremental approach to IT acquisition. Indeed, the initial 
IT 360 product iteration may not possess all of the desired capabilities. However, once the base 
architecture of the IT system in question is established, the process adds functionality to the 
system’s existing capabilities at a standardized, quick pace. The IT 360 process consists of seven 
phases that interact in a spiral fashion: (1) Program Initiation; (2) Increment Requirement 
Identification; (3) Initial Increment Level Material Development Strategy; (4) Architectural 
Alignment and Development; (5) Development, Demonstration, and Oversight; (6) Increment 
Capability Delivery; and (7) Operations and Maintenance. 
To maximize the benefits of the IT 360 acquisition process, we have identified four supporting 
initiatives: (1) documentation streamlining, (2) flexible contracting, (3) tailored program 
financial management, and (4) forward-looking standards and technology neutrality.  
We have also outlined a multi-tiered governance structure for the new process that is designed to 
promote stakeholder integration, speed, and ease of access. Unlike the traditional acquisition 
system, whereby the majority of oversight takes place prior to milestones and during key 
decision points within a specific program or portfolio of programs; the IT 360 process integrates 
oversight into each phase. In fact, one of the primary goals of the governance structure is 
maximizing internal adjudication—management personnel working directly within programs are 
in the best position to make qualified decisions. 
The IT 360 process has the potential to transform the DoD’s approach to IT acquisition. 
However, for this transformation to take place, a number of specific challenges must be 
overcome. These challenges are outlined as follows: 
• Contracting practices do not provide programs with enough contract flexibility at the 
portfolio level (across programs).  
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• Programs with evolving requirements are unduly constrained and unable to meet their full 
potential because the budgets of most DoD projects are established prior to its inception. 
• The DoD does not fully engage industry partners, making it difficult to control costs in 
the face of the fluid, evolving requirements envisioned by IT 360.  
• The DoD does not adequately balance the need for competition with contractor 
incentives.   
• The DoD has yet to engage in an enterprise-wide expansion of security standards and 
protocols.  
• The DoD lacks a disciplined approach with regard to the premature inclusion of system 
requirements.  
• Procurement laws, regulations, policies, and processes are not tailored to the current 
defense acquisition system.  
• The DoD lacks an appropriately trained, educated, and experienced acquisition 
workforce. 
 
There are also a number of institutional barriers that must be removed in order for IT 360 to be 
fully successful.  
• The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, 2010) continues to require that all 
research and development (R&D) funds used for programs be submitted to Congress at 
the start of the program.  
• Because defense business system programs often meet Major Automated Information 
Systems (MAIS) cost thresholds and are thus classified as such, defense business systems 
acquired via IT 360 may be subject to the rigid MAIS reporting process.  
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• Congress designates different authorities to oversee the discrete processes embedded 
within the traditional acquisition system; under IT 360, these processes are largely 
obsolete and create oversight ambiguities.   
• Congress requires that funds be used only for the programs and purposes for which the 
appropriation in question was made, rendering portfolio-level funding impermissible. To 
eliminate the ambiguity, funding should be through appropriations at the portfolio-level 
(mission area) for IT programs. 
Milestone Decision Authorities currently have the flexibility to implement and use our proposed 
process with Acquisition Category (ACAT) III programs immediately. Once the challenges and 
barriers previously outlined are mitigated, IT 360 can be extended to larger IT programs.  We 
believe that this new process, in conjunction with the complementary governance structure and 
supporting initiatives, will facilitate the timely acquisition of effective defense business systems 




The Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest organization in the world, with operations that 
span a broad range of agencies, activities, and commands.  With an annual budget approaching 
$700 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2012, the DoD employs millions of people that operate 
worldwide and maintains an inventory system that is an order of magnitude larger than any other 
in the world.  However, the business systems used to manage these resources are outdated and 
inefficient, even as continual innovation in IT has made computing and networking cheaper and 
faster.  These innovations have enabled many firms in the private sector to implement enterprise-
wide systems, significantly improving productivity and efficiency.   
More recently, IT has been used for far more advanced applications in virtually all types of 
organizations. Today, companies and government agencies are applying networked IT to 
facilitate complex tasks such as enterprise resource planning and supply chain integration. But 
although many private-sector firms (e.g., FedEx, Wal-Mart, Amazon) have successfully 
undergone a fundamental transformation of their businesses, government agencies have had 
much less success.2  The DoD has not been able to successfully leverage the full potential 
productivity improvements that IT systems offer, and it still lags far behind the capabilities of the 
“world-class” private sector.  This shortfall is, in large part, due to inefficiencies introduced by 
the DoD’s acquisition process. Today, the DoD continues to rely on many non-integrated, non-
interoperable legacy systems that are error-prone and redundant and that do not provide the 
enterprise visibility necessary to make sound management decisions.3   
The DoD’s one-size-fits-all acquisition process has, in many cases, failed to produce the required 
IT systems in a timely manner and within budget.  Indeed, nearly half of all major federal IT 
projects undertaken have experienced delays or changes to requirements that have led to cost and 
schedule overruns and program restructuring.  Of the re-baselined projects, half have 
                                                 
2 The commercial sector has also experienced challenges—only 16% of commercial IT projects are completed on 
time and on budget, and 31% are cancelled prior to their completion (House Armed Services Committee [HASC], 
2010).  
3 The DoD has reported that it relies on about 2,080 business systems, including accounting, acquisition, logistics, 
and personnel systems (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010). 
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encountered additional challenges and have been re-baselined at least one additional time (GAO, 
2008). A 2010 House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel on Defense Acquisition 
Reform found that the delivery of defense IT systems requires between 48 and 60 months, and 
the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III, stated that the implementation of 
new IT systems takes an average of 81 months (Jackson, 2011). Considering that commercial IT 
systems are on a 12- to 18-month upgrade cycle, it is often the case that the DoD’s new IT 
systems are outdated—often by several generations—by the time they are fully operational. 
Recognizing this unacceptable trend, the DoD has introduced a number of initiatives in the last 
decade in an effort to improve IT acquisition. However, little progress has been made. Most 
stakeholders believe, as do we, that minor initiatives do not go far enough to address the 
underlying conditions and obstacles.  We believe that a new IT-specific acquisition process is 
needed.  
The current, linear process—contained in the DoD’s 5000 Series publications—has proven 
relatively successful at producing effective weapons systems and platforms,4 but the process is 
ill-suited to the acquisition of IT-centric systems, including the various types of defense business 
systems. For instance, because the 5000 Series process is used for all acquisitions, it incorporates 
higher levels of fiscal risk management in order to ensure that the most risk-prone types of 
procurements are pursued with caution.  However, this level of risk management has proven 
excessive with regard to defense business systems, often delaying them beyond their effective 
time lines (Defense Science Board [DSB], 2009).  Defense business systems must be developed 
at a faster rate in order to keep pace with new IT innovation. Failure to keep pace invites a 
different type of risk: premature program obsolescence.   
We have developed a new process, IT 360, which, we believe, will enable the successful 
acquisition of defense business systems. IT 360 encompasses four primary objectives:  
 
                                                 
4 The initial version of the 5000 Series was first written in 1971 and has been updated several times (although the basic process 
has remained relatively unchanged). This documentation describes in detail the method of conducting defense acquisition. The 
current versions are DoD Directive 5000.01 and DoD Instruction 5000.02 . 
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• provide practical capabilities to the DoD enterprise quickly and efficiently; 
• incorporate commercial management practices in order to reduce overall risk;  
• grant maximum flexibility to the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) in order to reduce 
the reporting and administrative burden; and 
• respond effectively to the end users’ needs. 
Although this new process will remove many of the obstacles currently hindering IT 
procurement, it will not remove all of them. Accordingly, we have identified a number of 
initiatives to support the IT 360 process. These initiatives include document streamlining, the use 
of flexible contracting mechanisms, and the implementation of forward-looking, technology-
neutral standards. We believe that once these initiatives are aligned and interwoven with IT 360, 
the DoD will have the tools it needs to develop, acquire, and field world-class defense business 
systems. 
According to 10 U.S.C. 2222(j)(2), a defense business system is “an information system, other 
than a national security system, operated by, for, or on behalf of the DoD [that is] used to support 
business activities such as acquisition, financial management, logistics, strategic planning and 
budgeting, installations and environment, and human resource management.”  
Although the moniker of “business system” may leave one with the impression that these 
systems support only back-office operations, this is not the case. These systems can have a direct 
impact on warfighting capability in that all military operations are inherently dependent on the 
appropriate level of logistics support, and, consequently, the business systems that support 
logistics functions.   
Defense business systems can be categorized by the extent to which they rely on commercial 
products and solutions. Generally, defense business systems that leverage commercial 
development to the greatest degree practical will prove to be the most effective and efficient. The 





When the user requirements cannot be met in part, or in their entirety, by an existing or 
modified commercial product, the DoD must develop its own unique applications. While 
this type of full development enables the DoD to obtain a system that fulfills its every 
requirement, it generally requires a longer time commitment for software development, 
maturation, and testing (Adams & Eslinger, 2004). Furthermore, because the product is 
not available on the commercial market, the development of any complementary updates 
will also need to be fully sponsored by the DoD.  This is generally the least efficient way 
to acquire a defense business system. 
Commercial off-the-Shelf 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT products do not require modification or integration 
of other components prior to implementation by the DoD. While not all of the DoD’s 
needs can be met by adopting and adapting a full COTS solution, the benefits provided 
are significant. Most notably, the DoD can leverage the investment made in the private 
sector, significantly reducing development time, and the need for research and 
development (R&D; Adams & Eslinger, 2004). Additionally, these products are 
developed based on industry “best practices” and are also routinely updated by the 
developer for use in the private sector. Because COTS products are, by definition, “as-is” 
products, their integration into larger systems can be very complex and may require 
modification or the adaptation of requirements.  
Modified COTS 
Modified COTS products are commercial systems that are modified by the contractor to 
meet specific DoD requirements. Similar to COTS, development time and R&D are 
significantly reduced compared to one-of-a-kind DoD-developed systems. This method 
of procurement allows for the greatest degree of user customization and update options. 
To the maximum extent possible, the modifications required should be minimized by 
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adapting the “historic DoD practices” to the “best practices” built into the COTS 
products. 
Integrated COTS 
To meet unique DoD requirements, it is sometimes necessary to integrate both COTS 
systems and custom-developed systems into a larger system. Although similar to 
modified COTS, integration of COTS systems as components differs in that the former 
requires modification while the latter involves the use of COTS systems as components 
within the integrated system.  
Software as a Service 
Software as a service (SaaS) is a software delivery model whereby software is hosted 
centrally (today, the emphasis is on hosting via the Internet, or “the cloud”).  The idea of 
SaaS has been endorsed by the White House, and it has begun to gain some traction 
within the DoD. The recently released Cloud Computing Strategy (February 2011) 
asserted that “The cloud computing model can significantly help agencies grappling with 
the need to provide highly reliable, innovative services quickly, despite resource 
constraints” (Kundra, 2011, p.7).  The decision to apply a specific cloud-computing 
model must take into account user requirements; for instance, security is of the utmost 
importance.   
Report Approach 
In Part II of this report, we provide a background and overview of the current acquisition process 
used by the DoD. We then explain why it is ill-suited to the acquisition of IT. We address 
emerging factors—from security threats to declining defense budgets—that highlight the 
inadequacies of the current system. In Part III, we present a synthesis of government reports, 
academic papers, and proposed strategies aimed at reforming IT acquisition. In Part IV, we 
present our solution, IT 360, a new approach to IT acquisitions that is based, in large part, on our 
analysis of the documents summarized in Part III.  Next, we discuss our supporting initiatives 
and provide an overview of the complementary governance structure. In Part V, we discuss the 
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challenges and barriers that must be overcome for the new process to succeed. Finally, in Part 




The DoD’s current acquisition process is often described as a simple construct that efficiently 
integrates three interdependent processes: requirements, budgets, and procurements. Each of 
these processes, it is said, works both independently and cooperatively to drive the program 
toward meeting its objectives.  
The first of these—the product (or, alternatively, the system’s requirements)—are defined by the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which also provides the 
evaluation criteria for the acquisition program. Secondly, the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is used to allocate and manage the DoD’s financial 
resources. The third process, the Defense Acquisition System, is the mechanism through which 
DoD products and systems are developed and acquired. This process is described in some detail 
in the next section. In theory, each of these processes should work together in a coordinated 
fashion to deliver, in an efficient and cost-effective manner, essential capabilities to the DoD.  
However, the deficiencies of this overall process, especially with regard to the acquisition of 
defense business systems, have been known for some time. The Deputy Secretary of Defense’s 
Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report (Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment Panel, 2006) describes the acquisition process as a highly complex mechanism that 
is fragmented in its operation. According to the report, “the differences in the theory and practice 
of acquisition, divergent values among the acquisition community, and changes in the security 
environment have driven the requirements, acquisition and budget processes further apart and 
have inserted significant instability into the Acquisition System” (p. 3).  Under the current 
system, attempts to accelerate IT development cycles to keep pace with technical innovation 
serve only to amplify this fragmentation (Defense Acquisition Performance Project Panel, 2006).  




The Defense Acquisition System 
The Defense Acquisition System (codified in DoD Directive 5000.01, with detailed 
implementation instructions contained in DoD Instruction 5000.02) is used to acquire DoD 
products and systems (see Figure 1). The system is designed to translate mission needs and 
detailed requirements into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs. Although 
this linear acquisition process has a heritage based on the development of hardware systems, it is 
intended to accommodate the needs of all DoD programs, including IT.   
The Defense Acquisition System, updated in December 2008, consists of five life-cycle phases. 
• Materiel Solution Analysis. The purpose of this phase is to assess the potential materiel 
solutions for a military need; to refine the initial system solution; and to create a strategy 
for acquiring the solution. At the end of this phase, the program reaches Milestone A, 
where a decision is made as to whether or not the program will advance to the next phase.  
• Technology Development. During this phase, technologies are developed, matured, and 
tested in conjunction with the simultaneous refinement of user requirements. By the 
completion of this phase, the program must have mature technology, approved 
requirements, full funding, an acquisition strategy, and the acquisition program baseline. 
Additionally, the type of contract that will be used to acquire the system must be 
specified. The Milestone B decision authorizes entry into the next phase. 
• Engineering and Manufacturing. The purpose of this phase is to develop and integrate 
the full system, make preparations for manufacturing, and demonstrate (through testing) 
that the system can function in a real-world environment.  The decision at Milestone C 
authorizes low-rate initial production (LRIP) of the system.  
• Production and Deployment.  During this phase the system is produced, operationally 
tested, and deployed. 
• Operations and Support.  This is the final phase. Program personnel ensure that the 




Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition System  
(DoD, 2007) 
Acquisition Categories and Designations 
The DoD divides acquisition programs into four acquisition categories, or ACATs: ACAT I, 
ACAT IA, ACAT II, or ACAT III.  ACAT I programs are those requiring the most significant 
investment.  Non-IT programs estimated to require an eventual total expenditure of more than 
$365 million for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)  or more than $2.190 
billion for procurement5 are designated as ACAT I.  The most costly ACAT I programs are, in 
turn, designated as Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  These require supplemental 
review, in addition to more programmatic evaluation and documentation. 
Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) 
IT-based systems and services, on the other hand, can be designated as Major Automated 
Information Systems (MAIS).  MAIS have their own thresholds and reporting requirements (see 
Figure 2).  This process makes use of a shorter, five-year time line. While this time line 
                                                 
5 Figures in this section are in FY2000 constant dollars. 
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represents an improvement over the traditional process, five years is still quite long within the 
context of IT, with projects transcending multiple generations of IT products.  
 
Figure 2. The Defense Acquisition Process for MAIS Programs  
(DoD, 2007) 
A DoD acquisition program for an Automated Information System (AIS) is categorized as an 
ACAT IA if it meets one of the following criteria:  
• The program is designated by the MDA as a MAIS.  
• The program is estimated to exceed $32 million (in FY2000 constant dollars) for all 
expenditures and for all increments, regardless of the appropriation or fund source, 
directly related to the AIS definition, design, development, and deployment, and incurred 
in any single fiscal year. 
• The program is estimated to exceed $126 million (in FY2000 constant dollars) for all 
expenditures and for all increments, regardless of the appropriation or fund source, 
directly related to the AIS definition, design, development, and deployment, and incurred 




• The program is estimated to exceed $378 million (in FY2000 constant dollars) for all 
expenditures and for all increments, regardless of the appropriation or fund source, 
directly related to the AIS definition, design, development, deployment, operation, and 
maintenance, and incurred from the beginning of the Materiel Solution Analysis phase 
through sustainment for the estimated useful life of the system (DoD, 2007). 
The Current Defense Acquisition Process Is Ill-Suited for IT 
Some elements of the Defense Acquisition System only apply to weapons systems, some 
elements only apply to automated information systems, and some elements apply to both. The 
Defense Acquisition System has managed to successfully deliver weapons systems, and although 
they are often delayed and over budget, they generally prove to be very effective upon their 
deployment.   
The average time frame of an acquisition program is 8–10 years; however, many programs have 
considerably longer durations.  The F-22 program, for example, was delayed for more than ten 
years (in fact, more than 20 years passed between the start of development and initial operational 
capability). Defense IT programs tend not to take quite as long, but delays of long durations are 
still common. For instance, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported that 
six of the DoD’s nine ACAT IC6 Enterprise Resource Planning Systems experienced schedule 
delays ranging from 2 to 12 years, with development times ranging from 7 to 16 years (GAO, 
2009).  Most IT programs take between 48 and 60 months to deliver initial capabilities, with 
longer delivery times for MAIS programs. For 32 sampled MAIS programs, the average amount 
of time required to deliver an initial program capability was 91 months, or over 7 and a half 
years (Czelusniak, 1998).  
Because the DoD’s IT programs take so long to deliver, updating capabilities or requirements to 
incorporate new technologies can result in more delays and increased costs. Additionally, 
                                                 
6 ACAT IC programs are MDAPs, for which the MDA is the DoD Component Head or, if delegated, the DoD Component 
Acquisition Executive (CAE). The letter C refers to component (“Component,” 2011). 
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because the acquisition process does not allow for incremental delivery of capabilities, user 
feedback generally cannot be taken into account. Because user feedback is not incorporated into 
the current acquisition process, unnecessary functions are often built into new systems 
(Schwartz, 2009). The inclusion of these over-specified capabilities means that additional time is 
required to develop the system, thereby further delaying its release.   
Indeed, IT acquisition has proved challenging not only for the DoD but also for commercial 
firms. For instance, even with commercial systems, over-specification is common. In a 2002 
Standish Group report, 45% of commercial IT systems’ designed functions were reported as 
never being used (Johnson, 2002). Only 16% of all IT projects (i.e., government and 
commercial) are completed on time and within budget, and 31% are canceled (HASC, 2010).  
The remaining 53% are late and over budget, with typical cost increases exceeding the original 
budget by more than 89% (HASC, 2010).  Of the IT projects that are completed, the finished 
products contain only 61% of the originally-specified requirements (Johnson, 2002). Clearly, 
neither the DoD nor the commercial market are acquiring their IT products as efficiently as they 
could, and even if these figures reflect the true cost of acquiring IT (perhaps we simply 
underestimate the amount of time and money actually required to develop IT-based products), a 
more efficient acquisition process would reflect this reality through more accurate time lines and 
cost estimates. 
One of the key differences between information systems and weapons systems is the pace of 
product evolution. With defense business systems, IT development and maturation occurs 
primarily in the commercial sector and is driven by customer demand and innovation; the DoD 
generally only plays a minor role.  Commercial IT systems tend to evolve at an extremely rapid 
rate, with cycle-times approaching 18 months.  As a result, delays to DoD IT programs of even 
one or two years can significantly reduce the potential utility of the system, and although risk 
reduction strategies and accountability controls are essential to the development of costly 
MDAPs, using the same approach with IT systems slows the timely delivery of effective 
information systems.  
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Moreover, many of today’s IT products are modular (i.e., composed of standardized autonomous 
units allowing for flexible arrangement and reuse).  As a result, the point at which Program X 
ends and Program Y begins is often not well defined with regard to IT systems. Rather, programs 
overlap, and transitions between systems (and transitions between components within systems), 
are interwoven to the point where the term life cycle—a mainstay of the traditional acquisition 
process—is increasingly meaningless within the context of IT acquisition. 
Indeed, several of the phases of the Defense Acquisition System are of little relevance with 
regard to the development and deployment of information systems. For instance, LRIP has little 
meaning in the world of IT development; unlike tanks and aircraft, software programs are not 
produced on assembly lines. Incidentally, LRIP is one of the most risk-prone and most likely to 
be delayed phases of DoD programs (Cai et al., 2004).  And while the serial T&E prior to 
production is essential to the development of weapons systems, IT development needs a 
continuous cycle of testing during the development. In fact, in the commercial market, software 
programmers often rely on a very short development process known as test-driven development, 
whereby the developer writes a failing automated test case that defines a desired improvement or 
new function, then produces code to pass that test, and finally re-factors the new code to 
acceptable standards (Beck, 2003).  
Other Factors 
Acquiring defense business systems using existing, outmoded processes is an increasing liability. 
Today, there are several other factors that are increasing the need for an improved IT acquisition 
process. These include (1) budgetary constraints, (2) poor performance, (3) rapid pace of 
technology, (4) private-sector dominance, and (5) security concerns.  
1. Budgetary Constraints 
As the U.S. economy, still reeling from the recession of 2008, continues along the path to 
recovery, lawmakers are searching for ways to cut spending to reduce the country’s $14.5 
trillion debt. Congress has not yet developed a strategy to manage growing entitlement 
spending. Accordingly, the DoD, which consumes the second largest portion of 
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government revenue after entitlements, will likely see significant cuts in coming years. 
Indeed, cuts are already being made. In August 2011, Congress reached a budget deal 
that will impact the DoD budget in two ways.  The first was a $350 billion cut in defense 
spending over the next 10 years. The second was the threat of some $600 billion more in 
cuts, which would be automatically triggered in January 2013 since a special 
congressional committee failed to agree on future deficit reductions. As top military 
leaders confront budgetary constraints, the DoD will have to address the process by 
which it provides services and acquires all of its systems.  
2. Poor Outcomes 
Information systems relying on the MAIS acquisition process have experienced 
significant challenges. Take, for instance, the case of the Defense Integrated Military 
Human Resource System (DIMHRS). In the late 1990s, the DoD’s Business 
Transformation Agency launched the DIMHRS in an effort to consolidate more than 90 
Service-unique military personnel and pay systems. The original acquisition cost estimate 
of approximately $6.5 million had increased to over $1 billion in 2008 (Gansler & 
Lucyshyn, 2009). The first phase of the DIMHRS—the consolidation of all payroll and 
personnel functions for the Army into one integrated web-based system—was expected 
to be completed in 2009. The other Services were expected to implement the system 
shortly thereafter. But following numerous delays, technical problems, and schedule 
setbacks, not to mention significant cost overruns, the DoD announced the program’s 
cancellation in February 2010.  Approximately $850 million had been spent (Kundra, 
2010). 
3. Rapid Pace of Technology 
In 1965, Gordon Moore noted a trend in computing capabilities based on integrated 
circuits. First, he observed that the yields (as an increase in the number of components 
per function) in speed and power double every 18–24 months. Today, this is known as 
Moore’s law of increasing yields.  Since software is influenced to a large degree by 
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hardware capabilities, it is not surprising, then, that software capabilities change on the 
same timescale. Despite being first observed in 1965, this trend remains true today, as 
does its related impact on software.  Since DoD IT systems currently take anywhere from 
48 to 91 months to be developed, they are often outdated (or even obsolete) upon initial 
delivery, with some system elements several generations behind what is commercially 
available. 
4. Private Sector Leads Innovation 
IT innovation is driven, in large part, by the demand in the private market.  Progressively 
more sophisticated versions of, say, the iPhone are released by Apple in response to near-
continuous consumer demand.  The accelerating rate at which new personal computers, 
smartphones, and MP3 players appear on store shelves is as much a function of new 
technology (creating the demand for new capabilities) as it is the accumulation by 
industry of users’ feedback and desires.  Once the two processes—user input and 
technological innovation—merge, an uninterrupted loop spurs ever-increasing gains in 
efficiency and performance.  On the other hand, within the DoD there is often significant 
pressure to provide the troops with the best capability imagined in the first delivery 
increment. The irony is that a significant period of time passes during which nothing new 
is fielded.  
The current DoD acquisition system also lacks the agility that is inherent in the private 
sector.  Once texting became popular, for example, developers began to manufacture 
phones with full keyboards. They were able to do this in relatively short order because 
private industry is, by its very nature, acutely responsive to customer demand, creative in 
its solutions, and driven to maximize efficiency.  The DoD, on the other hand, plays by a 
different set of rules: there is no profit motivation, inefficiency is permitted, and the 
customer base (i.e., the user community) is small in comparison.  
Since nearly everything that the U.S. military needs in terms of IT is available in the 
private market, the DoD needs to leverage the best technologies from the private sector, 
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adapt them to their specifications, and deliver them quickly. The DoD’s legacy 
acquisition approach was designed to facilitate the acquisition of DoD-unique systems. 
With regard to IT, however, this process is anachronistic and incapable of keeping pace 
with the rapid evolution of IT. 
5. Security 
Growing concerns over cybersecurity have added a new dimension to IT acquisition.  The 
current system lacks robust, standardized security measures. Lone hackers and nation-
states alike have made attempts to infiltrate U.S. government systems in order to extract 
classified information.  In 2008, a Russian computer worm referred to as agent.btz 
infected the DoD’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) in what is largely 
considered the most serious breach of the DoD’s classified computer systems to date 
(Nakashima, 2011).  SIPRNet is not connected to the Internet, yet it is nonetheless 
vulnerable to worms and viruses. In the case of agent.btz, the worm was likely 
transmitted by a soldier whose infected thumb drive was inserted into a laptop connected 
to SIPRNet (Strategy Page, 2011).  The DoD has yet to remove all traces of the worm 
from its network.   
The threat is growing.  Cyber attacks targeting government agencies’ systems and 
websites increased by 40% in 2010. According to U.S. Cyber Command Chief General 
Keith Alexander, hackers probe the DoD’s systems over six million times per day 
(Nakashima, 2011).  And these “hacker groups” often include small groups of computer-
savvy American teenagers, criminals, foreign terrorists, and, at times, even nation-states 
(foreign states have begun to invest in cyber weapons). Recently, a hacker group known 
as LulzSec attacked and disabled private websites and the CIA and Senate public web 
pages and has divulged information taken from law enforcement business systems.  Their 
strategic purpose, if any, remains unclear. To counter cyber threats, the DoD must reduce 
its systems’ vulnerabilities through more frequent upgrades.  Secondly, it is essential that 
the DoD engage in an enterprise-wide expansion of its security standards and protocols 
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III. Major Reports on IT Acquisition 
Multiple independent studies of the government’s IT acquisition process have been undertaken in 
the last few years in an effort to identify ways to improve the process’s overall effectiveness, and 
although some have focused directly on the DoD’s IT acquisition, others have sought to address 
the more general, government-wide challenges. We conducted a meta-analysis of these 
challenges and identified common threads with regard to process deficiencies and 
recommendations.  Accordingly, our proposed acquisition process recognizes and adapts these 
commonly identified elements, attempting to correct the acknowledged deficiencies. The reports 
that we reviewed were produced between 2009 and 2010. They are listed as follows. 
• The 2010 National Research Council’s Achieving Effective Acquisition of Information 
Technology in the Department of Defense  
This report assessed whether the DoD could adopt best practices from the commercial 
sector for IT acquisition, systems engineering, and T&E. The report considered only 
those IT systems that support the DoD information enterprise and excluded IT-based 
components that are embedded in weapons systems or DoD-specific hardware. The report 
recommended that a new acquisition process be adopted, one that is tailored to IT, and 
that this process incorporate commercial-sector best practices. 
• The 2010 U.S. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Panel’s Defense Acquisition 
Reform, Findings and Recommendations 
 
This report focused on two specific deficiencies of the current acquisition process: 
financial management and management of the industrial base. With regard to financial 
management, the report noted that poor resource allocation stemmed from the lack of 
commitment to improved accountability on the part of senior leadership. The report 
recommended that the DoD improve the audit readiness of each of the military 
departments, providing sanctions and penalties if necessary. With regard to the industrial 
base, the report recommended that the DoD better analyze commercial price trends to 
ensure proper pricing. In addition, the report recommended that the DoD provide better 
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visibility to contract solicitations to ensure a level playing field, especially with regard to 
small businesses.  
 
• The 2010 TechAmerica’s Government Technology Opportunity in the 21st Century: 
Improving the Acquisition of Major IT Systems for the Federal Government  
 
This report asserted that stronger program oversight, better risk management, and greater 
agility are key to improving IT acquisition within the federal government. The report 
recommended that the government build a professional development program for IT 
program managers, use third-party independent risk reviews to assess IT projects, and 
promote more engagement between industry and government. The report asserted that 
agile development can only succeed when an incremental process is used and that 
incremental processes are, in turn, only successful in an interactive and collaborative 
environment. 
 
• The 2010 Association for Enterprise Information’s Industry Perspectives on the Future of 
DoD IT Acquisition 
 
This report offers “unsolicited views of a team of industrial and academic experts” on the 
implementation of a new acquisition process. The report recommends that the DoD 
“institute continuous, iterative, development, test, and certification processes that drive 
the commercial IT state-of-the-art commercial to deliver off-the-shelf building blocks” 
for the DoD’s systems (p. ii).   
 
• The 2010 IT Acquisition Advisory Council’s A Roadmap for Sustainable IT Acquisition 
Reform: Congressional Summary 
 
This report summarizes the specific challenges that agencies face in executing existing IT 
policy and agency mission objectives. The report highlights the need for a more agile 
non-weapons system acquisition approach to IT. The report suggests that the new process 
embrace IT cloud infrastructure, which would provide the majority of applications as 
software services. In addition to adopting a new IT process, the report recommends that 
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the DoD implement supporting initiatives centered on transparency, culture change, 
leadership, oversight, and an improved acquisition workforce. 
 
• The 2009 Government Accountability Office’s DoD Needs to Strengthen Management of 
its Statutorily Mandated Software and System Process Improvement Efforts 
This report assessed the extent to which the DoD has implemented certain software and 
systems process improvement actions mandated in the National Defense Authorization 
Act for FY2003. The GAO concluded that weaknesses still exist with regard to system 
and software acquisition and the development process. The GAO also provided examples 
of cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls across a range of DoD software-intensive 
programs.  
 
• The 2009 Defense Science Board’s Department of Defense Policies and Procedures for 
the Acquisition of Information Technology 
 
This report undertook an extensive review of DoD policies and procedures for the 
acquisition of IT. The report examined acquisition and oversight policies and procedures, 
roles and responsibilities for acquisition officials department-wide, and reporting 
requirements and testing as they relate to IT acquisition. The report concluded that the 
DoD should adopt a unique acquisition process for IT and that such a process must be 
designed “to accommodate the rapid evolution of information technologies; their 
increasingly critical position in DOD warfare systems, warfare support systems, and 
business systems; and the ever evolving and often urgent IT needs of our war fighters” 
(p.10). 
 
All of the reports concluded that the current acquisition process is ill-suited to the acquisition of 
IT and described the inability of the process to efficiently deliver IT systems on time and on 
budget. The reports cited numerous deficiencies with regard to the process, product 




• Process Deficiencies 
One major point of failure is that the Defense Acquisition System process tends to stall at 
milestone decision points. When a system reaches these milestones, programs must gain 
approval from many different functional organizations. It can take up to 90 days for a 
milestone decision to be reached (DSB, 2009). When one considers that commercial IT is on 
an 18-month development cycle, these delays are not tolerable. When a product that has been 
delayed is finally released, it is often the case that the requirements, technology, and 
standards have changed.  In addition to the milestone decisions, excessive program 
documentation requirements create additional delays and shifts, which distance the existing 
process from commercial best practices.  
Applying the Defense Acquisition System approach to the acquisition of defense business 
systems generally does more harm than good, since the threshold of risk management that the 
Defense Acquisition System requires is higher than the risk associated with the mature 
technology used to produce defense business systems. Because the Defense Acquisition 
System is designed to reduce the risk associated with multibillion-dollar, complex weapons 
programs, repetitive and detailed reporting requirements are designed to provide improved 
visibility so that program personnel can identify problems early on. With their longer 
duration—from JCIDS initiation to full deployment—changes are much more likely to occur 
(HASC, 2010).  For this reason, repetition of reporting requirements may be less of an issue 
and may merit the additional time and resources. However, because defense business systems 
can be developed with less inherent risk—and in one-tenth the time—extensive and repetitive 
documentation is problematic.  
Finally, continuous T&E must occur throughout IT development cycles. Because defense 
business systems are highly dependent on stakeholder feedback, continuous T&E ensures 
that this feedback is integrated into the product as efficiently as possible (in the form of new 
features, more intuitive design, and so forth). Continuous T&E obviates the need for the 
intensive redesign that often occurs following large blocks of untested development. Under 
the Defense Acquisition System, T&E supports a specific phase of development, which, for 
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physical systems and platforms, may be the only way to effectively evaluate a program. 
However, for IT systems, the lack of continuous T&E causes delays and cost overruns while 
limiting the potential effectiveness of the product.  
• Development Deficiencies 
The DoD has a clear need for integrated enterprise-wide business solutions. COTS products 
can help meet this need.  While it is true that COTS solutions are sometimes inappropriate 
within the context of major weapons acquisitions, this is not the case with regard to defense 
business systems.  The DoD is, after all, an organization that requires much of the same 
infrastructure as any other large business enterprise.  
Although COTS-based sourcing is recommended in DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000.2, in 
practice, it continues to face significant resistance. In part, this stems from an unwillingness 
to adapt certain business processes (National Research Council, 2010). For instance, there is 
often significant pressure to provide the troops with the best capability. This translates to the 
formation of specific requirements, some of which are Service-unique and technologically 
challenging. Additionally, it is thought that in adopting COTS solutions, the Service branches 
necessarily relinquish control over programmatic elements. But even when enterprise-wide 
systems are not COTS-based, control and requirements issues arise. For example, in the case 
of the DIMHRS program, referenced in the previous section, the Navy resisted system 
implementation because DIMHRS lacked requirements that the Navy believed were 
essential.  
The procedural impact associated with the capabilities development document (CDD) and 
contract also creates an aversion to COTS sourcing. A CDD is “a document that captures the 
information necessary to develop a proposed program, normally using an evolutionary 
acquisition strategy. The CDD outlines an affordable increment of militarily useful, 
logistically supportable, and technically mature capability” (Defense Acquisition University 
[DAU], 2011). In the Defense Acquisition System, the CDD is used to support and inform 
the Milestone B decision, which authorizes entry into the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) phase. It includes requirements and expectations for the program that 
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must be completed at each phase of the acquisition program, up to and including deployment. 
Since the system relies on a single CDD, programs aim to achieve a 100% solution upon the 
initial capability release (Armour, 2002).  The program’s “big bang” requirements slow the 
process by creating more documentation and longer development phases. Luckily, for IT 
programs, post-release upgrades are much easier to integrate, as demonstrated by the agile, 
incremental approach to software production used within the commercial sector, an approach 
that facilitates the addition of marginal improvements over time (Lapham et al., 2010). Thus, 
the “80% solution” that COTS products often provide is entirely appropriate with regard to 
IT. 
• Management Deficiencies 
Developing and implementing IT systems requires technical knowledge that is both specific 
and extensive. Because the DoD does not have a separate IT acquisition process, even 
program managers who have proven highly successful at managing weapons systems 
acquisitions may not be adequately prepared to take on IT systems management. Currently, 
the DoD does not require managers to have IT-specific knowledge and experience to manage 
IT programs, nor does there exist training courses designed to enhance technical skills (DSB, 
2009). As a result, the DoD relies heavily on service contracts with the private sector to 
manage its IT acquisitions. 
In addition to program management, strategic management has also been highlighted as an 
area of concern. Strategic management is provided through regulations from the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS), and other legislation. These regulations have proven crucial to controlling cost 
overruns in the past and to providing Congress with the ability to maintain its oversight role 
over the DoD. With regard to IT acquisition, one of the most critical regulations is Section 
804 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, which mandates the development and 
implementation of a new IT acquisition process. While this act is certainly a step in the right 
direction, it is true that congressional oversight has, on occasion, created ambiguities in the 
DoD’s acquisition strategy.  For instance, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Clinger Cohen Act, 
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and the 2005, 2007, and 2009 NDAAs lacked clarity with regard to specific features of their 
implementation.7 Rather than promoting innovation and flexible responses to acquisition 
problems, the ambiguities led to the creation of more structure, which, in turn, increased the 
amount of documentation. Although these congressional acts may have reduced systemic 
risk, they also prompted cost increases and programmatic delays. 
There were also commonalities with regard to the recommendations contained in the reports. 
Based on our analysis, we have identified what we believe to be the most important 
recommendations.   
• Develop a new, separate IT acquisition process. 
• Take advantage of the agility afforded by incremental development approaches, 
economies of software reuse, and ubiquity of web-based commercial products. 
• Embrace established standards and an open systems approach.   
• Use standard systems that support uniform security requirements, rather than develop 
independent solutions for each program or increment.   
• Break typically large programs into small, incremental developments that are quickly 
delivered within the same IT generation. 
• Provide continuous or short cycle oversight rather than oversight based on long-term 
milestones. 
• Generally, require less documentation. 
• Use lower level documents to define capabilities at the increment level. 
                                                 
7 These federal laws continue to complicate the acquisition of the DoD’s IT systems (i.e., Goldwater-Nichols, 
Clinger-Cohen, and the NDAA FY2008).  They cause overlapping responsibilities between the Under Secretary of 
Defense (AT&L), the Department’s CIO, and the Deputy Chief Management Officer.  
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• Use business case analyses more broadly and as a basis for analysis and justification for 
increment approval. 
• Incorporate early and continuous user involvement in the process. 
• Use iterative prototyping to reduce risks and shorten the overall process.   
• Blend the current multiple program test events into a single process rather than individual 
tests that start and stop independently. 
• Ensure flexibility in contracts to allow for required changes as they occur. 
• Make funding as flexible as possible for increments within programs.  
• Provide stable funding. 
• Set high-level, “big-R” requirements at the outset of a program.  
• Develop detailed requirements throughout the acquisition process (program 
management).   
• Develop and retain a cadre of IT domain experts to support oversight and decision-
making (DoD acquisition workforce). 
We have incorporated these recommendations into a new acquisition process: IT 360.  
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IV. IT 360 
The IT 360 process is a revolutionary approach to IT acquisitions that results in rapid acquisition 
and provides continuous iterative and incremental delivery of useful, affordable, and 
architecturally compliant capabilities with adequate oversight, reporting, and documentation. IT 
360 increases end user functionality while encouraging competition throughout the process—
from program inception to retirement. The proposed use of COTS, standards, and existing 
capabilities to the maximum extent practical reduces development and unnecessary engineering, 
testing, and support costs.  These programs, however, will require active engagement with 
functional management and users throughout the development process as well as flexibility 
throughout development, testing, and contracting.  Ultimately, the process will be able to 
produce effective systems quickly, at less cost and with less risk.  
The IT 360 process is specifically tailored to the acquisition of defense business systems. 
Embedded within IT 360 are a series of initiatives, which, we believe, will allow the DoD to 
enhance the speed and efficiency with which it acquires its defense business systems. These 
initiatives are described in detail in the following subsections.  
1.  Spiral Development 
The IT 360 process is based on the concept of spiral development. Since 1988, spiral 
development has served as the prevailing commercial model for developing software. Spiral 
development is a cyclical approach to incrementally growing a system's capabilities while 
decreasing risk. Unlike sequential development processes whereby a product’s features are 
prescribed early on, spiral development is agile and responsive, incorporating innovations that 
arise during development. Because the base architecture does not change, the spiral development 
process adds functionality to a system’s existing capabilities at a quick, standardized pace 
(Lapham, Williams, Hammons, Burton, & Schenker, 2010). This allows development teams to 
leverage what they have learned from each of the previous iterations and adjust specifications 
and capabilities as needed to increase program and system efficiency.   
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2. Smaller, Quicker to Deliver, Useful Sets of Capabilities 
Large programs are broken into smaller, agile increments that are responsive to innovation and 
new technology, allowing for the rapid development of new capabilities. These rapid incremental 
developments allow program managers to quickly identify and mitigate program risk as it arises. 
As a result, managers are able to communicate program status to stakeholders quickly yet 
comprehensively.  Smaller increments carry less risk, thus permitting the delegation of decision-
making authority, which enables more timely decisions by people who are directly involved in 
the program. These officials are in the best position to accelerate, redirect, or cancel an 
increment’s release.  Each increment can then be integrated into a system of systems 
environment, which is seldom the case under the traditional acquisition process. Accordingly, 
incremental delivery requires less overhead. 
3.  Rapid Delivery 
Time-to-delivery is a key objective (perhaps even a key performance parameter) for every IT 
program. IT 360 programs will rigorously employ a scheduling concept whereby traditional 
milestones and key decision points are established early on, and these are scheduled in much 
shorter periods.  For example, the time allocated to complete a business case and program 
implementation plan (leading to a build/procurement decision event) is much shorter 
(approximately 30 days) under IT 360.  Similarly, capability releases occur on an accelerated 
schedule (i.e., initial increment capability delivery occurs 360 days after program initiation). 
When coupled with the smaller increments, the release of subsequent iterations will vary 
depending on the nature of the program but will occur on a schedule established by program 
managers.  
4.  Greater Use of COTS Products 
Incorporating the greater use of COTS products into IT programs is essential if the DoD is to 
shorten its acquisition time lines and reduce costs. Like the DoD, large corporations rely on 
business systems for a host of different reasons, including payroll, accounting, supply chain 
management, and the delivery of goods and services to customers. Today, most business 
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software is developed in the commercial sector. Given the similar needs of private enterprise and 
the DoD, it stands to reason that the DoD should look to the commercial sector to procure its 
business systems or, at the very least, core system components.  
COTS products are advantageous because the development, T&E, and security measures have 
already been completed and funded by the private sector. Furthermore, because COTS are 
available for purchase within the private sector, the market has set the price, which ensures that 
the DoD is not overpaying. As mentioned previously, even if a COTS product does not fulfill all 
of the necessary requirements, the DoD can elect to modify the product or integrate it into 
another system. Moreover, since COTS products incorporate mature, proven technologies, the 
risk to the DoD is minimized.  Currently, COTS products are underutilized by the DoD, 
primarily because they fail to meet all of the “small-r” requirements, which, by definition, are 
often not mission critical. Frequently, the marginal benefit of these small-r requirements can be 
offset by other features that are built into the COTS product over time.   
Use of proven capabilities that are pre-tested and pre-certified will accelerate deliveries of 
capabilities and shorten time lines while reducing costs and delivering useful, architecturally 
compliant capabilities within the established time frame.     
5.  Aggressive Use of Prototypes and Demonstrations 
DoD acquisition programs often rely on pilot programs and demonstrations of capabilities as a 
means of reducing risk.  Requiring a product—be it a C-5 aircraft or a payroll software 
program—to operate in a real-world environment, as opposed to the theoretical one in which it 
was conceived, allows program personnel to identify problems prior to the product’s fielding.  
Prototypes and demonstrations incorporate, at minimum, a basic level of development that can 
be later incorporated into the full program upon approval. The IT 360 process will encourage the 
delivery of prototypes and demonstrations by the vendors, along with their proposals.  These will 
be used during source selection, reducing technical risk and enabling the selection of developers 
and integrators with a demonstrated ability to implement the required system.  Finally, in some 
circumstances, they will serve as the initial increment upon which increased capabilities are 
evolved over time.  
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6.  Continuous and Integrated Testing 
With weapons system programs, serial T&E prior to production is essential to the development 
of weapons systems.  IT development, however, requires a continuous cycle of testing during 
development—blending software qualification testing (SQT), DTE, OTE, and interoperability.  
Moreover, by including representative operational data sets and simulation tools, program 
managers can help ensure the release of refined, useful capabilities using stressful operational 
environments.  As a result, these tests occur in a near-operational environment prior to fielding, 
which helps to ensure interoperability, compliance, and compatibility with DoD architectures, 
standards, and operating environments.  Because testing is continuous, security vulnerabilities, 
hyper-specified and unnecessary features, and other potential problems can be identified quickly. 
By permitting operational experience to inform future product requirements, IT 360 ensures that 
systems are optimally suited to the needs of their users. 
7. Decentralized Execution 
More frequent product reviews serve to enhance the relationship between the program manager 
and senior-level authorities as well as to facilitate more timely decision support from acquisition 
staffs and the oversight community. Because each increment has defined capabilities and is 
released according to a set schedule, there is less financial risk. Accordingly, there is less need 
for burdensome oversight and the associated documentation requirements that are built into the 
current acquisition process. 
8.  Inclusion of End Users 
Including users and other stakeholders throughout the process allows program personnel to better 
understand mission needs. Similarly, the user community is better able to understand product 
capabilities when they attend regular meetings with program officials and are part of the 
decision-making process. Additionally, encouraging user engagement throughout product testing 
is crucial in that user feedback helps to ensure that simulations occur in realistic operating 
environments.  Providing users with early prototypes enables them to adopt existing processes to 
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new capabilities while at the same time allowing program personnel to more efficiently 
incorporate users’ emergent behaviors. 
9.  Enhanced Competition 
Competition is a driving force in the U.S. economy and a vital component of efficiency and 
improved market performance in both the public and private sectors.  It provides incentives to 
produce better products faster, at lower costs, and with better quality: this has been proven 
repeatedly.  IT 360, with its smaller increments and shorter cycles, enables competition at the 
launch of each new iteration.   
10.  Cybersecurity 
While this report does not address cybersecurity in any detail, we recognize that maintaining 
cybersecurity is of the utmost importance.  This critical issue must be considered throughout the 
IT acquisition cycle, to include the post-implementation operational procedures. The use of data 
standards, open architectures, COTS, and modular products will enable the implementation of 
up-to-date technology, also facilitating strengthened system security.  
The IT 360 Process  
IT 360 is both an evolutionary and an incremental approach to IT acquisition. Indeed, the initial 
IT 360 product iteration may not possess all of the desired capabilities. However, the process is 
intended to be continuous and seamless, completing each 360-degree cycle in approximately 360 
days.  The objective is to more closely match the development cycle of commercial IT systems.  
Therefore, once the base architecture of the required IT system is established, the IT 360 process 
adds functionality to the system’s existing capabilities at a quick, standardized pace. 
Development teams leverage what they have learned from each of the previous iterations and 
adjust specifications and capabilities as needed to increase program and system efficiency and 
functionality. In short, IT 360 allows for the gradual refinement and improvement of a system 




Figure 3. The IT 360 Process  
Note. Initial increment capability delivery occurs 360 days after program initiation, at which 
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The seven phases of the IT 360 process and their objectives and durations are summarized as 
follows. 
Phase 1: Program Initiation 
The IT 360 process begins with a Program Initiation phase.  The initiation phase lays the 
foundation for program acquisition in four distinct ways. First, initial market surveys are 
conducted in order to generate potential solutions and establish a successful acquisition strategy. 
Using this strategy, the high-level requirements for the program are determined. These high-level 
requirements—sometimes referred to as “big-R” requirements—specify general system 
capabilities. Less emphasis is placed on minor requirements (the over-specification of which 
often leads to cost overruns and delays); rather, minor requirements are deferred to future 
increments.  Next, both the high-level requirements and the market surveys are used to establish 
the overall procurement strategy, which will inform future phases over multiple iterations. 
Support contractors may be relied upon to develop the system’s architecture or to provide 
systems engineering. Once the strategy is established, program- and portfolio-level governance 
are then created and initiated.  
Phase 2: Identification of Increment Requirements and Priorities (30 days) 
After a program has been initiated, it enters the Identification of Increment Requirements and 
Priorities phase. During this phase, all potential solutions are considered, including COTS and 
other open-source solutions. Solutions are evaluated based, in large part, on how well they 
enable data transfer. In the past, the ease with which existing data could be transferred to new 
systems was overlooked, requiring thousands of hours of labor of manual input. With a total 
duration of approximately 30 days, the secondary goal of this phase is to ensure that capabilities 
are assigned to appropriate increments. By continuing the market surveys begun during the 
Program Initiation phase, program personnel work to ensure that the initial requirements meet as 
many user demands as possible, without front-loading onto early increments the more difficult, 
though perhaps nonessential, requirements. This is an important distinction over the Defense 
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Acquisition System process, which has a tendency to “waterfall” requirements, leading to 
increased rigidity throughout the process. This phase concludes with a material development 
decision (MDD). 
Phase 3: Initial Increment Level Material Development Strategy (30 Days) 
After a program has been approved through the MDD milestone, the Initial Increment Level 
Material Development Strategy phase begins.  During this phase, a procurement strategy that is 
both product-specific and increment-specific is devised. While much of this strategy was 
developed during the previous phase, it is during Phase 3 that program personnel delineate a 
highly-structured, comprehensive business case (i.e., program justification) and a fully developed 
acquisition plan and develop a mechanism that ensures coordination of stakeholder involvement. 
With an approximate duration of 30 days, this phase finalizes development and planning for the 
initial increment. The Initial Increment Level Material Development Strategy phase is completed 
upon the approval of a request for proposals (RFP) by the Program Governance Board (PGB). 
Phase 4: Architectural Alignment and Development (120 Days) 
After the release of an RFP to private-sector contractors, the Architectural Alignment and 
Development phase begins. This phase, which marks the beginning of system development, has a 
duration of approximately 120 days. The PMO may need to contract for the necessary technical 
expertise to assist in writing statements of work and/or provide objective analyses of government 
or contractor progress toward meeting system development goals. For ease of upgrades, 
standards-based open architecture is strongly encouraged; this will preclude a specification that 
is based on a proprietary product and avoid restrictive intellectual property rights issues and 
vendor lock-in.  
Once the architecture is determined (i.e., the strategic, programmatic, and incremental 
requirements set forth in the proposal are approved), a risk assessment is conducted via 
prototyping and other methods.  Appropriate risk reduction strategies are then implemented.  
Once it is determined that the architecture carries sufficiently low risk, Phase 4 concludes, which 
prompts the issuance of the CDD.  The CDD clearly details why the system is needed; how it 
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will be used; where the system will be located; who will need it; when it will be available; what 
the system is intended to do; how the system will be supported; and how much it will cost.  
Contracts are written to reflect the information contained in the CDD. 
Phase 5: Development, Demonstration, and Oversight (180 Days) 
The issuance of a CDD marks the beginning of the Development, Demonstration, and Oversight 
phase, as well as the contract award.  With an approximate duration of 180 days, it the longest 
phase of the IT 360 process but also the most crucial.  At this milestone, the decision authority 
approves the acquisition strategy, enterprise contracting/buying strategy (lease/buy, buy as a 
service), increment level detailed requirements, and market and spend analysis, acquisition 
program baseline, program implementation plan, test plan, and documentation.  During this 
phase, the program manager will manage the development and demonstration of the proposed IT 
solution for a release of capabilities within specified cost, schedule, and performance parameters. 
Further, procurement strategy should call for the purchase of only the software license quantities 
needed to complete integration, testing, and demonstration. The remaining license quantities 
needed for full system deployment are deferred until after successful T&E and demonstrations. 
Additionally, during this phase, multiple iterations of the system may be developed and tested 
(T&E is integrated into each iteration). Upon the release of each iteration, stakeholder input, 
oversight, and if appropriate, corrective action are combined to guide development of the next 
iteration.  When successful, the program manager can rapidly deploy the capability or continue 
to demonstrate the capability in a live operational environment, depending on the nature of the 
program. 
Phase 6: Increment Capability Delivery 
Assuming that the system fulfills the strategic, programmatic, and incremental requirements, the 
PGB will authorize its entry into the Increment Capability Delivery phase.  This phase has two 
main functions: full fielding and the transition to long-term operations and maintenance (O&M). 
Depending on the circumstances, fielding might include the product’s integration into other 
systems or services or the transfer of data from old systems to the new system. The second 
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function is the transition of the product to long-term O&M.  This entails the creation or 
augmentation of a support structure specifically tailored to the capabilities of the newest product 
iteration. 
Phase 7: Operations and Maintenance 
The Operations and Maintenance phase oversees the creation or augmentation of a support 
structure specifically tailored to the capabilities of the released product. This entails 
complementary documentation and ongoing training in support of the recent release, refreshment 
of software, bug fixes, and administrative support.  Because future increments have new 
capabilities, the O&M phase is critical in that it ensures that previously released increments are 
able to interoperate seamlessly and securely with earlier versions. 
Entrance into this phase depends heavily on the user’s satisfaction with the solution and 
willingness to use the IT capability in the operational environment.  The support plan is executed 
to meet the operational needs of the IT system in the most cost-effective manner. This plan will 
identify strategies to respond to discrepancies, failure reports, and hardware and software updates 
and upgrades.  
Supporting Initiatives 
To maximize the benefits of the IT 360 acquisition process, we have identified four supporting 
initiatives: (1) documentation streamlining, (2) flexible contracts, (3) tailored program financial 
management, and (4) forward-looking standards and technology neutrality. These initiatives are 
described in the following subsections. 
Documentation Streamlining 
Program documentation serves two purposes. First, it helps to ensure that program requirements 
are understood and executed properly by the contractor, which reduces risk to the DoD. Second, 
documentation is used to provide program personnel with program status and updates. Under the 
current Defense Acquisition System process, the level of documentation varies and depends, in 
large part, on the program’s ACAT designation (10 U.S.C. 2445(a)).  Requiring extensive and 
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excessive documentation results in longer acquisition time frames and higher costs and increases 
the likelihood of miscommunication between the DoD and the contractor.  These requirements 
unnecessarily complicate IT acquisition programs. Consequently, a fundamental tenet of any IT 
acquisition process must be to require “just enough” documentation. Documentation should be 
tailored to mitigate risk while reducing reporting burdens.  Further, since similar programs are 
likely to face the same risks, programs should be grouped into categories based on their shared 
similarities. Standardized, category-specific documents could then be created and used by 
programs within each group. The governance bodies must ensure that documentation 
requirements are consistent with this principle of “just enough” and that required reviews are 
completed quickly. Indeed, many of the reports listed in Section II recommended that such an 
approach be used not only within the DoD but also across the federal government (Acquisition 
Solutions, Inc., 2009).  
Moreover, programs should promote the reuse of standardized documents. Currently, documents 
are completed at multiple points throughout the acquisition process, although these documents 
often reflect no new data (Drezner et al., 2006). Each document, its submission, and its 
subsequent evaluation requires time and money to complete, thereby eroding the efficiency of 
the acquisition process. Indeed, the government and its contractors often hire document 
specialists to facilitate this process, which increases program overhead and, thus, the cost to 
government. By authorizing the reuse of standardized forms throughout the process in order to 
eliminate redundancies, efficiency could be increased.  
Further, establishing document page limitations could also serve to further reduce the burden for 
both reporting and reviewing entities and allow for quicker decisions. In addition, because the 
commercial sector is driven to improve efficiency in order to maximize profits, it strikes the right 
balance between documentation burden and risk mitigation. Accordingly, the DoD should 
consider adopting a documentation strategy that leverages the proven practices of the 
commercial sector by adhering to similar standards. 
Finally, various technologies can be used to replace some of the required documentation. Online 
collaboration and status dashboard software are two such technologies. Online collaboration 
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software allows multiple entities to simultaneously share data and multimedia on a shared digital 
workspace anytime, anywhere. In addition to online collaboration, electronic status dashboards 
should be used, either independently or in conjunction with online collaboration. Often, 
information reported via status dashboards is coded to reflect its importance; an imminent 
problem might generate greater visibility to attract the attention of certain stakeholders, allowing 
issues to be identified and resolved more quickly. Currently, program personnel and decision-
makers are frequently alerted to problems only after they occur, because the needed information 
is embedded in a lengthy report that is released only at a certain point within the acquisition 
process. Status dashboards allow personnel to home in on the information that is most critical 
without having to sort through superfluous documentation. 
Flexible Contracts 
Currently, most contracts contain rigid requirements. Yet despite this rigidity—or perhaps 
because of it—current contract structures frequently fail to incentivize innovation; rather, 
contractors appear more or less content to meet the minimum requirements.  More agile contract 
vehicles must be pursued to encourage greater private- and public-sector collaboration.  Indeed, 
the commercial sector has begun to rely on innovative, flexible contracting and has been 
successful in reducing risk, using new contracting vehicles in combination with spiral 
development. Since the addition, removal, and alteration of requirements is expected as a 
program progresses in order to benefit from stakeholder feedback, contracts should be flexible 
enough to reflect this ongoing requirements definition. 
Further, costs can be reduced in both the short and long terms by frequently interjecting 
competition at various points throughout the process. Moreover, since contractors bid only on 
work for one iteration, there is a strong incentive to provide the best value—especially when 
relevant prior experience and results is considered in the award. To maximize flexibility, 
portfolio-level contracting should be used because it allows managers to readily add or divert 




Tailored Program Financial Management 
It is difficult to fund emerging technologies or adapt standards between budgetary cycles; 
although funding can be appropriated from the next fiscal year’s budget, doing so usually causes 
delays, which, as explained previously, decrease the effectiveness of the IT 360 process and, 
thus, the utility of the defense business system in question. Unfortunately, tailoring current 
financial management practices may prove difficult.  31 U.S.C.  1301 dictates that 
“appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made 
except as otherwise provided by law.”  We advocate for a more flexible funding mechanism 
(e.g., multiyear portfolio accounts).  The introduction of such mechanisms may necessitate 
changes to current law, an issue we explore in more detail in Part V of this report. 
Forward-Looking Standards and Technology Neutrality 
The use of forward-looking standards (i.e., those that facilitate a product’s technical evolution, 
rather than constrain it) will assist developers in meeting both the big-R requirements and the 
small-r requirements. To the maximum extent practical, standards should be based on those that 
have already been developed for the commercial sector.   
Relying on commercial standards helps to ensure an IT product’s relevance and longevity.  In 
instances where it has developed its own unique standards, the DoD has experienced both failure 
and success.  For instance, in 1977, the DoD began development of the programming language 
Ada, the use of which was later mandated for practically all DoD software.  The DoD adopted a 
series of policies to encourage the endorsement of Ada as the universal commercial standard, to 
be used in designing all embedded systems. It went as far as to mandate its use in all DoD 
software applications. However, despite these efforts, Ada was never widely adopted, and 
because the commercial market dwarfed the military market, it eventually fell out of use, even 
within the DoD (Chapin, 2004).  
In 1997, the DoD began development of the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). An open 
systems framework known as the Software Communications Architecture (SCA), developed by 
the program, was key to the system’s interoperability.  Even though the JTRS program has had 
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some major challenges, the SCA has been a real success and is the de facto standard for all 
software-defined radios, to include those developed commercially.  Despite this success, the 
development of new standards should only be pursued when acceptable standards do not exist 
within the commercial sector. Commercial standards generally support the design of modular 
products. As mentioned previously, the DoD must seek to maximize the modularity (i.e., the 
degree to which the rules of the system architecture enable or prohibit the mixing and matching 
of components) of its IT products.  Indeed, commercial standards can be leveraged not only to 
smooth the transition between current IT and future IT systems, but also to augment the capacity 
of the DoD’s IT infrastructure by facilitating the development of a vast network of IT products 
and systems that collectively offer greater functionality than the sum of the products within the 
network. 
In addition to the use of standards, adopting a technology-neutral approach will reduce 
programmatic risk by facilitating data reconciliation and migration. In July 1997, President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore released a report entitled Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce, which stated, “rules should be technology neutral (i.e., the rules should neither 
require nor assume a particular technology) and forward looking (i.e., the rules should not hinder 
the use or development of technologies in the future)” (p.1). An example of an effective 
technology-neutral approach is a service-oriented architecture (SOA). SOA is an IT approach 
that relies on the separation of architectural layers to ensure interoperability and compatibility 
when designing software. This approach allows developers to package functionality as a suite of 
interoperable services. With this approach, these services are generally well-defined 
functionalities that are built as software components that can be reused for different purposes. 
IT 360 Governance Structure 
The IT 360 governance structure was designed to promote stakeholder integration, speed, and 
ease of access. Overlapping governance is a key structural attribute of the IT 360 process that 
enhances the success of IT acquisitions. Traditionally, the majority of oversight takes place prior 
to program milestones and at key decision points within a specific program or portfolio of 
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Figure 4. IT 360 Governance Structure 
One of the primary goals of the multi-tiered IT 360 governance structure is maximizing internal 
adjudication (see Figure 4).  When a problem or issue is brought forward by the program 
office/contractor, user, or other stakeholder, it is immediately brought to the attention of the 
PGB, which is composed of officials at the program management level. In conjunction with 
stakeholders, the program governance board identifies a solution and provides a corrective 
action, which is then executed by the PMO in the event that the issue cannot be resolved or if 
consensus is not obtained, the problem is elevated to an issue-based working group. These 
working groups are integrated process teams consisting of a program office representative, 
contractor personnel, and members of the user and stakeholder communities. These entities are 
highly invested and, collectively, highly knowledgeable about all program areas.  After the team 
formulates solutions to the problem in question, these solutions are forwarded to the Governance 
Adjudication Board (GAB).  This board is at the level of the project executive officer (PEO); as 
such, it is able to grant greater authority to the decision.  As with the PGB, if and when 
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consensus is reached, the solution is forwarded to the PMO for execution. If, however, another 
stalemate occurs, final adjudication is provided by an upper-tier authority, usually the mission 
manager.  
Requirements, for example, will mature over time, and governance mechanisms must be 
structurally and institutionally prepared to deal with these anticipated requirement changes. The 
PGB would track, adjudicate, and resolve changes and make assessments of changes for their 
potential impact. 
The tiered structure depicted in Figure 4 was designed to minimize delays in decision-making. 
This is accomplished by streamlining the milestone decision process, incorporating more 
governance between milestone decisions, and making more efficient use of documentation. The 
lower tier consists of PGB personnel who work within the program or portfolio and oversee all 
activities. While the upper tier has responsibility for multiple programs, along with the authority 
to adjudicate all decisions within the program, it is primarily concerned with high-level issues 
and the resolution of stalemates.  High-level issues could include, for example, the reallocation 
of funds among programs or the strategic realignment of programs.  Intra-program issues, such 
as the reallocation of funds within a program or portfolio, on the other hand, would be carried 
out by PGB-level personnel.  This represents a significant change in responsibility; generally, a 
program’s internal funding allocation is the responsibility of the PEO (lower tier).  The IT 360 
governance structure has the potential to reduce delays and enhance programmatic success by 
granting decision-making authority to those most familiar with the inner workings of the 
program, which, in turn, reduces the overall administrative and documentation burden. 
Furthermore, IT 360 governance requires that program managers define and implement pre-
agreed time limits for all decisions. One of IT 360’s stated objectives is to resolve issues within 
30 days or fewer or elevate the problem to the GAB, which, in turn, must resolve the problem in 
30 days or fewer or elevate the decision.  
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V. Challenges and Barriers 
The IT 360 process has the potential to transform the DoD’s approach to IT acquisition.  
However, for this transformation to take place, a number of specific challenges and barriers must 
be overcome.  
Challenges 
These challenges revolve around the following longstanding issues: contracting practices, 
funding, industry cooperation, competition, requirements, cybersecurity, and workforce.   
Contracting Practices 
The accelerating pace of change of information technology, particularly in the commercial 
sector, requires greater contract flexibility in order for the DoD’s business systems to remain 
current.  Contracts must be structured to reflect incremental developments and decisions as well 
as the evolving requirements definition.  For example, when using a rapid-cycle, spiral approach, 
program managers will need flexibility to defer requirements to the next increment on their own 
authority. DoD contracting practices, however, generally do not provide programs with this level 
of flexibility. Even where the DoD attempts to adopt commercial approaches and practices, 
government contracting differs significantly from commercial practices because of regulatory 
and legislative factors. These factors include fiscal constraints, requirements for transparency, 
and the required audit and oversight. As a result, attaining the desired contract flexibility is a 
challenge.  
Furthermore, flexible contract frameworks for common products and services should be 
contracted at the portfolio level (i.e., across programs). Given the degree to which IT programs, 
their objectives, and their requirements are interrelated, portfolio-level, flexible contracts 
increase efficiency while minimizing the costs associated with contract writing and oversight. 
Whenever possible, programs should use proven commercial practices, including performance-
based contracts.  DoD programs should also take into account past performance and experience 
with similar efforts. In order to incentivize the greatest level of innovation, lowest price, 
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technically acceptable (LPTA) criteria should be avoided as the source selection criterion, except 
for the most routine of services. 
Funding  
For reasons similar to those mentioned previously, flexible funding is crucial to the success of 
the IT 360 process, and its provision lays the groundwork for programmatic success.  Currently, 
with the lengthy budget process, it can take as long as three years to define a requirement well 
enough to request funding. This lengthy process creates a perverse incentive to buy IT 
capabilities in large, long-term lots—which is exactly the wrong approach.  Development teams, 
however, need to be able to take advantage of opportunities as they arise or to avoid technical 
difficulties as necessary.  As requirements evolve between spirals, programs need greater latitude 
to realign funds within the scope of the total program, if necessary.  Consequently, to support a 
fast-paced, agile IT acquisition process will require a more agile budgeting process, particularly 
when the requirements for subsequent increments of capability are not yet sufficiently defined.   
Program executives must be able to allocate and divert funding based on a particular program’s 
progress in meeting its objectives.  An alternative approach is for the DoD to adopt a “level-of-
effort” funding model at the portfolio level.  This paradigm would provide a predictable stream 
of adequate funding to ensure adequate funding is available to support multi-increment 
developments as well as to upgrade and sustain fielded capability.  Using this approach creates a 
budgetary limit, placing the burden on the program to define capabilities that can be fit into those 
constraints (DSB, 2009, p. 52).  Effective oversight can be maintained through the more 
thorough pre-planning stage, along with periodic milestone reviews.  If one program is 
struggling to contain costs or is encountering technical challenges, funding can be reallocated at 
the discretion of the program executive. 
In addition, “color of money” restrictions between capital and O&M accounts can prevent 
program management from responding to unforeseen situations by making trade-offs among 
internal milestones and priorities in order to achieve overall cost, schedule, and performance 




To achieve the ideal balance and control costs in the face of changing requirements will require 
that DoD programs engage industry as partners in the new process.  During the acquisition of IT, 
requirements generally evolve during the development process, with only a small number of 
mission-critical big-R requirements being prescribed at the program’s inception. The current 
acquisition process does not facilitate this evolution of requirements.  On the contrary, the 
process strongly discourages changing requirements after Milestone B is reached.  Acquisition 
teams must take better advantage of industry’s understanding of technology alternatives and 
advances by collaborating with industry during the requirements development process.  
Government procures products and services from industry when industry is best suited to 
perform the required functions. This collaboration will help to clarify requirements, minimize the 
number of questions, and ultimately lead to better solutions being developed by industry.   
Competition 
The DoD must maintain the potential for competition throughout the IT 360 cycle while 
rewarding outstanding results (performance, cost, and schedule) with follow-ons.  Rewarding 
outstanding firms while at the same time maintaining the option for competition will require 
informed decision-making and even-handedness.  Often, in an effort to enhance competition, 
firms that regularly achieve superior results (in terms of performance, cost, and schedule) are 
required to recompete purely for competition’s sake.  This is an unnecessary burden for firms 
with proven records of accomplishment.   
There are several measures that programs should take to ensure that the potential for competition 
is not unnecessarily constrained.  Using an open architecture and commercial standards will 
facilitate potential competition during each evolutionary cycle, since proprietary constraints can 
restrict the entry of competing firms that would then have to start from scratch.  Further, 
customization of COTS software often leads to increased software maintenance and personnel 
costs, software update complications, and potential roadblocks to contract recompetition.  At a 
minimum, customization will require developing a specific software patch every time the COTS 




Within the DoD, there is a strong aversion to partial solutions.  Often, requirements capabilities 
are not assigned to future increments; rather, they are front-loaded onto the initial requirements 
document.  By adopting IT 360’s evolutionary approach to acquisition, essential technologies can 
be fielded in the near term by delaying the instantiation of more time-intensive, costly, or 
technically challenging capabilities, some of which may, in fact, prove unnecessary.  However, 
the new process is not immune to the premature inclusion of requirements. Program personnel 
should strive for well-defined objectives, but not over-defined requirements, for the initial 
increment. 
Additionally, specifying unique requirements will drive up the cost of programs that use COTS 
products.  Therefore, program personnel should shape their requirement to fit the capabilities and 
processes of the COTS products, and not the other way around.  This will help to minimize 
customization of commercial products as well as benefit from the commercial best practices 
embedded in the software.  For the new process to be successful, program personnel must adopt 
a disciplined approach towards requirements.   
Maintain IT Security 
The 21st century has brought together a variety of factors that have heightened the need for 
improving the DoD’s IT systems security.  First, the DoD is increasingly dependent on efficient 
business operations, almost all of which are IT-based.  For example, current supply chain 
strategies (e.g., lean, just-in-time) reduce operating costs but can create new security 
vulnerabilities.  Moreover, modern, “world-class” logistics systems (e.g., Wal-Mart, FedEx, 
Caterpillar, GE, etc.) are all IT-based.  But cyberspace is no longer a protected domain; rather, it 
exists within the global commons and is accessible to virtually anyone with the requisite 
knowledge.  It is not surprising, then, that cyber attacks have begun to play a larger role in 
modern warfare.  One need only to look at Russia’s recent use of a combination of cyber and 
kinetic attacks in its conflict with Georgia. The DoD’s IT systems are not immune; recently, 
General Keith Alexander, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, asserted that DoD systems 
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are “probed by unauthorized users approximately 250,000 times an hour, over 6 million times a 
day” (Lawson, 2010, p.1).  
The increased use of COTS software that is envisioned under IT 360 presents some unique 
challenges.  With commercially developed software, DoD employees may be less familiar with 
the computer in question, which could lead to poor management and decision-making.  
Additionally, since many of these commercial software products are large and complex, they 
often comprise millions of lines of source code. This level of complexity makes it exceedingly 
difficult to detect all security threats.  
Workforce 
The last challenge relates to the quantity, quality, and culture of the DoD acquisition workforce.  
The DoD’s acquisition workforce has been downsized significantly over the course of the last 
two decades, which has led to a marked reduction in the DoD’s internal technical competencies.  
Approximately 63% of today’s government IT acquisition workforce are 45 years of age or 
older, and many lack the specialized skills of the younger generation. While private-sector 
contractors have a role and must continue to support the acquisition of IT systems, it is clear that 
the DoD must work to rebuild its acquisition workforce to ensure that it has the requisite ability 
to control the development of its information systems. This will require significant and specific 
action on the part of government. Priorities should include increasing government workforce 
agility, developing and enhancing human capital, and providing leadership stability to ensure 
program continuity. 
Most of the legacy personnel and organizations have years of experience developing 
requirements-driven, specification-constrained, custom-designed and -built components and 
systems. The new process will substantially change the skills needed to effectively manage 
delivery of information capabilities. Under IT 360, they will need to incorporate constantly 
evolving, market-driven commercial systems.  In many cases, this fundamentally changes the 
work that these personnel perform. The new workforce will need to cultivate a significant 
familiarity with the IT marketplace and technology trends, knowledge of cybersecurity, a strong 
understanding of user needs and priorities, the ability to perform trade-off assessments between 
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alternative strategies for implementing needed capabilities, the capacity to actively manage risk, 
and the skills necessary to create capability and investment road maps.   
In short, for IT 360 to be successful, the DoD must employ an appropriately trained, educated, 
and experienced acquisition workforce. The DoD must make changes with regard to how it 
handles recruitment, retention, and rotation (between government and industry). In addition, it 
must overhaul its acquisition education and training curricula so that it is aligned with the 
realities of today’s IT priorities. 
Barriers 
There are a number of barriers to implementation, which must be removed in order to 
successfully implement the new process.  These barriers are in the form of laws and regulations 
that were written by Congress to improve oversight over the Defense Acquisition System; many 
of them are imbedded in the NDAA, specifically in titles 10, 31, and 40 of U.S.C.  Portions of 
these laws may have to be changed to fully implement IT 360 as envisioned.  
Research and Development Reporting 
The NDAA continues to require that all R&D funds used for programs be submitted to Congress 
at “the start of the program” (NDAA, 2010).  This regulation is intended to ensure that R&D 
funding is accounted for and that oversight is adequately provided. However, given the 
evolutionary nature of IT 360 and the fact that many programs within a portfolio may benefit 
from the same R&D, reporting should be completed on an incremental or portfolio-level basis.  
MAIS Reporting Thresholds 
MAIS reporting procedures have been codified in multiple laws over time. As mentioned 
previously, MAIS programs are subject to more rigid reporting standards compared to non-
MAIS programs. More specifically, 10 U.S.C. 2445(a) establishes MAIS cost thresholds that 
ultimately require program-based reporting and cost analysis. Because defense business systems 
often meet MAIS cost thresholds and are thus classified as such, defense business systems 
acquired via IT 360 may be subject to the MAIS reporting process. This process hinders 
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acquisition because it does not facilitate incremental development. 10 U.S.C. 2445(a) should 
include provisions that allow for portfolio-level reporting for MAIS defense business systems. 
Designated DoD Authorities 
The designation of authority for all DoD acquisitions is established by Congress to ensure that 
oversight is properly applied to DoD programs. 10 U.S.C. 2222–2223 and 40 U.S.C. 11315 
designate different authorities to oversee what were once discrete processes embedded within the 
traditional acquisition system. For example, the authority of investment review boards to analyze 
the strength of DoD investments was separate from that of the chief information officer who was 
responsible for ensuring product integration. As a result, there is ambiguity with regard to which 
oversight body holds the decision-making authority at certain points within the new process. 
Unless a change is made, oversight may be applied inconsistently. The previously mentioned 
statutes should be amended to clarify roles and create new ones, including, most notably, 
functional portfolio managers.  
Specified Appropriations 
Under the IT 360 approach, requirements may be added or altered after the budget cycle has 
completed without increasing the level of programmatic risk. Indeed, flexibility is one of the key 
attributes of the IT 360 process. However, this flexibility is jeopardized because 31 U.S.C. 1301 
requires that all funds appropriated by Congress be used only for the programs and purposes for 
which the appropriation was made.  
The current system’s PPBE process, described in Section II, incorporates this congressional 
mandate and, thus, presents challenges to the efficient acquisition of IT.  Specifically, Congress 
appropriates funding based on programs and appropriations categories (e.g., RDT&E; 
procurement). This allocation scheme can be problematic if, for example, a program is allocated 
more than enough for development but needs to fund additional testing. As previously 
mentioned, under the current system, reallocation of funds among phases is impermissible. 
Furthermore, the budget component of the PPBE process requires a three-year lead-time—even 
obtaining “reprogramming authority” (within low levels of funding) is very time-consuming.  
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With an 18-month change cycle, delays of this sort significantly reduce the potential for the 
successful implementation of a highly functional information system. Data standards, 
cybersecurity standards, and common industry-based protocols all change at regular intervals. 
Rigid budgetary constraints inhibit the integration of these new protocols and standards across 
programs. The appropriations cycle should be tailored to IT acquisition—and not vice versa. 
Funding through congressionally specified appropriations should be eliminated in favor of a 
regulation that codifies portfolio-level funding for IT programs. 
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VI. Conclusion  
The DoD’s current approach to IT acquisition is unable to deliver capabilities in a timely, cost-
efficient manner. As the DoD works to improve its acquisition process for its IT systems, it must 
also contend with rapid technological change and a difficult economic environment in which 
budget pressures continue to mount.  To achieve these objectives, the DoD must find ways of 
making the acquisition process deliver IT capabilities faster and more effectively. This report 
provides an alternative approach that can assist the DoD in accomplishing that goal. 
Our review of various reports, government documents, and proposed strategies revealed a 
number of common themes. Chief among these themes was that the new IT acquisition process 
must leverage the agility afforded by an incremental development approach, economies of 
software reuse, and the ubiquity of web-based commercial products.  Building on these themes, 
we have developed IT 360, which, we believe, should replace the traditional one-size-fits-all 
approach (based on the acquisition of weapons systems) for the acquisition of defense business 
systems. The features of the new process—smaller increments, continuous testing, and iterative 
prototyping—will improve performance, increase efficiency, and reduce costs. We have also 
proposed a number of supporting initiatives that should be implemented to strengthen the 
process. These include the use of flexible funding and contracting mechanisms as well as the 
inclusion of end users throughout the process.    
The Milestone Decision Authority currently has the flexibility to implement and use our 
proposed process with ACAT III programs. Over time, the use of IT 360 can be extended to 
larger program categories (e.g., MAIS). However, in order for IT 360 to reach its full potential, 
the DoD must clarify roles and oversight responsibilities. At the same time, the DoD must also 
work with Congress to make the required legislative changes with regard to funding and 
reporting.  
Given the current budgetary environment and the increased political pressure to reduce defense 
spending, the DoD must improve the efficiency with which it develops, acquires, and fields IT 
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systems. But even in the absence of such pressure, the DoD has a responsibility to the taxpayers, 
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